Arunachal Border clashes: How do Asia's two giants manage conflict?
Jayanta Roy Chowdhury
New Delhi, Oct 28 (UNI) It was supposed to be the Autumn of India-China rapprochement. President Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to New Delhi for a Summit meeting of BRICS leaders in mid-September, and then within six weeks, reports broke of face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops in Arunachal Pradesh's Taksing circle.
The encounters came into focus last Thursday, when Indo-Tibetan Border Police Director General Shatrujeet Kapur, spoke of them, but had been reported earlier by locals who had claimed that Chinese intrusions had increased over time.
"They have been trying what is called salami slicing in the eastern Himalayas for some time … the Chinese People's Liberation Army is under pressure, the Navy has been active threatening Taiwan, patrolling the Pacific and Indian Ocean up to Sri Lanka, while the Army has had purges of its generals. This, from their perspective, may be a way of
winning their spurs," said Lt Gen (Retd) Utpal Bhattacharyya, a defence analyst specialising on China, told UNI.
Since 1962, when the Chinese made headway into Arunachal and Ladakh in a short border war, the PLA has not been able to gain much traction against Indian forces. It lost a short action at Nathu La pass in Sikkim against Indian troops in 1967, and had to back down at Sumdrong Chu, a valley they had occupied in 1986, in Arunachal Pradesh. On Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun maintained that China had consistently honoured bilateral agreements, describing its activities as "routine patrols" intended to "protect territorial sovereignty and maintain border stability".
"As firing is not allowed by way of an understanding between the Chinese and Indian forces, they have tried to take advantage by aggressive patrolling to establish future claims," Gen Bhattacharyya explained.
Defence ministry sources said such encounters are "neither new nor likely to disappear soon". Analysts point out that, since India and China have failed to mutually delineate the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC), despite numerous rounds of negotiations, their competing perceptions of where the actual boundary stands, "leaves ample scope for
recurring confrontations."
Recent unsubstantiated reports of encounters near Asaphila and Longju in Upper Subansiri district reflect the two countries' differing interpretations of the LAC, analysts feel, while pointing out that available reports do not establish that the Chinese have taken control of any area within Arunachal.
"Armies strive to remain prepared for any contingencies … we do that too, using electronic, ground, air, and space-based sources of information to obtain intelligence and be in a position to pre-empt any disposition by the adversary," said top defence analysts.
Beijing calls Arunachal Pradesh 'South Tibet' and has consistently rejected the McMahon Line, agreed upon in 1914 between British India and the Tibetan government as the official border. The fact that the sixth Dalai Lama was born in a village near the border town of Tawang has lent symbolism to the area in Chinese perception, ever since it invaded
Tibet in 1950. In October 1962, Chinese forces overwhelmed Indian positions around Thagla Ridge and Bumla Pass before advancing towards Tawang. However, the Chinese faced a difficult winter, which could block their supplies through Himalayan passes quickly withdrew after advancing.
More recently, in the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu confrontation, Chinese troops occupied Wangdung, a pasture India considered to be on its side of the boundary. New Delhi responded by rushing in troops and its then newly acquired Bofors artillery guns, bringing the countries close to another military conflict.
The crisis, however, ended without escalating, paving the way for the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit to China in 1988, where Deng Xiaoping signalled that the two nations could overcome historical antagonisms despite having an unresolved boundary dispute.
Today, both countries have substantial reasons to avoid prolonged confrontation. Bilateral trade in goods and services reached USD 155 billion in 2025. The two giants also need each other's cooperation to secure energy supplies through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea routes in an era of wars rocking West Asia.
"India needs to continue beefing up its defences and infrastructure, which it has been doing over the last two decades, even as we increase our economic engagement with China to have more leverage in managing conflicts in the region," said Pinak R Chakravarty, former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs.
New Delhi should use its economic relationships, regional partnerships and international standing to raise the costs of continued Chinese coercion while keeping channels for negotiation open. A durable boundary agreement will require both sides to recognise that endless confrontation serves neither country's long-term interests.
UNI JRC RSA
